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1. Introduction 
“Last fall, a 31-truck United Nations convoy laden with wheat flour, health supplies, and emergency aid 
left Syrian government-controlled western Aleppo bound for thousands of civilians in the opposition-
held countryside. UN banners hung from the front and sides of each truck. After extensive 
negotiations, Syria’s government approved the aid convoy, its movements coordinated at every step. 
Its progress was even monitored by a Russian drone. Still, the aid never reached the people in need. 
Instead, while en route, masked armed men looted three of the trucks. Then, the convoy was bombed, 
killing aid workers and other civilians” by Akshaya Kumar, Deputy United Nations Director at Human 
Rights Watch (Kumar, 2017). 
A United Nations (UN) Report concluded that either a Syrian aircraft or a Russian 
aircraft bombed the aid convoy despite the agreements amongst the involved actors 
on a ceasefire and the provision of aid to the Syrian population in need. The failure of 
the ceasefire to provide protection for humanitarian aid shows the dire prospects for 
peace in Syria when security cannot even be ensured for relief provision. All parties 
knew that there was an aid convoy on the way to Aleppo to provide humanitarian aid, 
and despite this the agreement was violated (Perry & Davison, 2016). Even when all 
involved parties negotiate for a more peaceful situation and reach a consensus, this 
event illustrates that the actors are not completely willing to establish peace.  
This problem is, amongst other things, a result of the expansion of the number of 
involved actors and their interests. All actors are fighting their own war in Syria on 
different political levels. Moreover, these various levels of fighting make the civil war 
a proxy war. The local actors are striving for territorial dominance and power change 
in the civil war. On the regional level there is a fight between the Islamic Sunni and 
Shia groups, the Kurds and the Turkish, recently between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
and against the Islamic terrorist organisation IS. On the global level, The United 
States of America (USA) and Russia are involved with their own incentives and 
stakes. Each actor is supporting other actors, which creates a complex proxy web 
that limits prospects for peace, and the international actors can fight their own war 
without spilling blood on their own territory in the playground called Syria (Spiegel, 
2016). Every action in this kind of war becomes highly politicised because of the 
various fights, and, therefore, to provide neutral aid to the population in need is highly 
problematic. 
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1.1. Research Question 
Understanding of the relationship between humanitarian aid and peace prospects, 
and the differences between this in the case of a proxy civil war and a non-proxy civil 
war is important because these wars are of different natures. There may be a much 
greater need for a case specific approach when the conflict is fought not only on a 
local level, but also on a regional and global level. This could mean that the strategy 
to provide aid must change in order to improve prospects for peace because of the 
indirect involvement of foreign actors. This research is designed to provide an answer 
to the following question: How does humanitarian aid affect peace prospects 
differently in cases of proxy civil war compared to non-proxy civil wars? This answer 
will be based on case studies of Syria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Because there is a 
difference in type between a proxy civil war and a non-proxy civil war it can be 
presumed that humanitarian aid affects peace prospects differently. There is a small 
but important difference between humanitarian aid and peace prospects in the case 
of a proxy civil war and a non-proxy civil war. Humanitarian aid and the effect it has 
on peace prospects in the case of a proxy civil war is much more complicated. Peace 
is differently affected by aid in a proxy civil war because aid providers and their 
donors are usually from foreign countries, and these foreign countries could be 
contracting the proxies and have more influence on aid provision. Aid has a certain 
influence and power because of the provision of necessities to a population and 
could ‘win the heart and minds’ of these people. Aid could influence these people to 
continue fighting or the press for a peaceful situation on the local level. However, 
even when on the local level, like in a non-proxy civil war, a consensus on a more 
peaceful situation has been reached, on the other layers in a proxy civil war this has 
to be the same otherwise aid influenced by proxy contractors could remain to affect 
peace prospects.  
 
1.2. Key Term Definitions 
To answer the research question, the key terms of this study must be defined. The 
most important terms in this research are humanitarian aid, civil war, proxy war, and 
peace (prospects). 
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The goal of humanitarian aid (or humanitarian assistance/emergency relief) is to 
provide basic necessities to the population which is in need of the immediate 
provision of medical items, food, water, etc. This type of aid is categorised as short-
term aid or, in this case, emergency aid. Humanitarian aid is an important component 
of peace-building, but the consequences of humanitarian aid provision are 
controversial. The controversy of humanitarian aid provision is that while aid is by 
nature meant to provide help, it can also unintentionally prolong conflict (Narang, 
2015). Moreover, aid relies on humanitarian principles such as neutrality, but tends to 
be less neutral when the donors have specific interests (Hattori, 2001). Humanitarian 
aid can shape and influence the behaviour of those who receive it, and therefore 
donors find aid provision useful to gain support. Aid is used politically by donors and 
aid providers such as the military (Wood & Sullivan, 2015). On the other hand, aid 
can help establish a more peaceful situation when it is adapted to the needs of the 
community (Anderson, 1999). Aid does not have a set format and the provision of aid 
must be tailored to the situation.  
Civil wars rarely take place only within the state in which they mainly occur. In a civil 
war the government is most frequently in conflict with one of more non-state local 
actors, and the neighbouring countries are often involved in the conflict because 
refugees are crossing the borders in search of safety, water, food, and shelter. 
Moreover, other countries may be involved in peace promotion and conflict 
resolution. However, the involvement of a foreign actor can both prolong and end a 
conflict depending on the type of involvement of the foreign country. When a foreign 
actor’s purpose is to mediate, it is more likely that a conflict can be resolved. 
However, when the foreign actor is directly intervening militarily, the conflict is more 
likely to be prolonged (Sawyer, Gallagher Cunningham, & Reed, 2017). Foreign 
actors become involved in a civil war primarily to promote security, nation-building or 
regional peace (Brown, 2016). However, this is not true in the case of a proxy civil 
war. A proxy (civil) war is a war which involves local and foreign state and/or non-
state actors on the local (civil) level and on (multiple) regional and international levels 
with actors in the role of “benefactor, proxy, or adversary” (Groh, 2014, p. 150). The 
benefactor, or other said, the external/foreign (non-)state actor, usually trains and 
funds the proxy, often “surrogate fighters, tribal proxies, and mercenary militias” 
(Williams, 2012, p. 1). The training and funding of the proxy by the benefactor is 
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conditional and are given to accomplish the goals of the benefactor despite of the 
goals of the proxy itself (Groh, 2014). “Proxy wars are the logical replacement for 
states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid 
engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare” (Mumford, 2013, p. 40). The proxy is 
fighting its own war, and the benefactor is fighting its overarching war with the use of 
the proxy as a tool and/or weapon, and therefore the most convenient proxy is 
chosen by the benefactor (Groh, 2014). The benefactor is reliable on the proxy and 
therefore there is a certain cost when the proxy is not pursuing the benefactors goals. 
Proxy wars enlarge the scale and mostly prolong the conflict (Groh, 2014). As 
Alexander Pope describes the idea behind the involvement of foreign actors in a 
proxy war, they are “[willing] to wound, and yet afraid to strike” (cited in Hughes, 
2014, p. 523). Instead of using the state’s own military, the government may see it as 
more effective to use local groups because of their knowledge of the landscape and 
culture. This prevents casualties within the state of the behind-the-scenes actor while 
still enabling it to fight for its own interests. By providing material, financial, and 
economic support to the local group the foreign actors are “fighting their own political 
war” (Brown, 2016). Proxy groups are policy tools and proxy warfare is part of foreign 
policy agenda. While a civil war is mostly a conflict on a local level, a proxy civil war 
is played on different levels: local, regional, and globally, depending on the number of 
foreign involved actors (Hughes, 2014). 
As long as (local) actors are engaged in an armed conflict resulting in casualties and 
deaths, prospects for peace are poor. In this case, a secure situation for the 
population and a peace resolution are out of reach. Peace is a broad term and may 
refer either to a temporary period such as a ceasefire or a long-term period. Peace 
can mean “to stop a civil war and establish a secure environment and respect for the 
rule of law” (Steele, 1998, p. 67); put differently, “peace is the absence/reduction of 
violence of all kinds” (Rossier, 2011, p. 19). 
 
1.3. Methodology 
This study is based on qualitative research in order to explore the differences 
between a proxy civil war and a non-proxy civil war in relation to humanitarian aid 
and peace prospects. Qualitative research was performed using primary and 
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secondary sources for a combination of academically underpinned arguments on the 
key terms and experience and facts on the cases. Primary sources were analysed 
along with reports on cases from news websites (only news websites which are not 
from one of the proxy countries were used in order to prevent bias), as well as 
reports and documents of organisations such as the UN and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Secondary sources consist mostly of articles 
from academic journals and think tanks and the arguments and analyses of the 
writers of these articles as related to my research. The findings are applied most 
frequently to the Syrian case in order to determine whether there is a possibility for 
aid and peace prospects in Syria. Moreover, the cases of the Vietnam and Afghan 
proxy civil war will be used to reflect on the differences between a proxy civil war and 
a civil war in relation to humanitarian aid and peace prospects.  
The case of Syria was chosen because it is a current complex proxy civil war without 
prospects for peace at present. The other cases have been chosen to show 
differences in outcome between the use of humanitarian aid in establishing peace 
and differences in the outcome of the proxy wars. Other types of aid than 
humanitarian aid (short-term aid) are excluded, such as developmental aid, which is 
focussed on the development of a state during and after a conflict and is considered 
long-term aid. This research addresses only short-term, emergency aid because this 
type of aid is the most applicable during (proxy) civil wars. Developmental aid is 
usually provided in a more stable situation to develop a state or region in an 
environmental, economic, social, and/or political way in the aftermath of a conflict. 
One limitation of this research is that I am not able to read languages other than 
Dutch and English, and therefore the research is based on Western literature and will 
be from a Western perspective. External factors such as war economics and the 
economics of aid are not included in this research despite their influence in a conflict 
because they are out of the scope of the research. This research focuses solely on 
humanitarian aid, peace prospects, and (proxy) civil wars in the cases of Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Vietnam. 
The structure of the research is as follows. First, existing literature on the relationship 
between humanitarian aid, civil war, and peace prospects is researched and the gap 
which this research is intended to fill is identified. Second, the link between 
humanitarian aid and proxy wars in general is examined. Third, the situation in Syria 
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and the relationship among all domestic and foreign actors is described. Fourth, the 
provided aid in Syria and the difficulties of this for the aid providers are described. 
Fifth, the establishment of peace in Syria is reviewed to identify the chances and 
challenges for creating a more stable and peaceful situation between the involved 
actors. Sixth, the role of humanitarian aid in previous proxy civil wars in Vietnam and 
in Afghanistan is reviewed. Finally, a conclusion is drawn regarding differences 
between humanitarian aid and peace prospects in proxy civil wars and non-proxy civil 
wars as seen in the cases. 
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2. Literature Review 
Various scholars have researched the relationship between humanitarian and 
conflict, mostly civil wars. These scholars have several opinions on how humanitarian 
aid could affect peace prospects. The academic literature regarding humanitarian aid 
and civil war will be reviewed in this chapter to be able to compare this with proxy 
civil war with the use of case studies later on. It can be said that adapting aid to local 
needs and factors and distribute aid equally could create prospects on peace 
establishment in the case of a civil war. However, aid could be abused by groups to 
continue war without using the own resources first. If aid resources are not delivered 
properly, this could do harm because aid has the power to take away influence from 
groups with the delivery of necessities. Aid could also be used as military and political 
tool.  
 
2.1. Opportunities for Aid 
Anderson states that aid cannot be separated from conflict. Aid can help resolve 
conflict, but can also make it worse, depending on the impact the aid has on the 
tension and connection between the groups in a conflict. Several factors link groups 
in conflict with one another. These include systems and institutions, attitudes and 
actions, values and interests, common experiences, and symbols and occasions. 
These factors can either support peace or fuel conflict. Anderson suggests that if aid 
providers recognise the contribution that these factors may have and adapt aid 
provision for these factors, aid can improve peace prospects (Anderson, 1999, pp. 
24-33).  
Meininghaus recognises the usefulness of these local factors and argues that aid 
could play an important role in peace prospects in the Syrian conflict. However, she 
also recognises difficulties for humanitarian aid in civil wars. According to the 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), states “are obliged to grant access, secure 
safe passage for humanitarian personnel and goods, and assist humanitarian 
organisations when needed” (Meininghaus, 2016, p. 4). In practice, humanitarian 
organisations are often not granted access but rather must strategically negotiate 
with various groups to be able to gain access and resources. These negotiations by 
humanitarian organisations place them in the local governance system, which is an 
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interdependent effect of humanitarian aid (Meininghaus, 2016). However, aid 
providers are more likely to have access to rebel territory when the rebels are at an 
advantage in comparison with the opposition and if the rebels can gain from 
providing access. It is assumed that there is a cost-benefit analysis (Carbonnier, 
2015, p. 20). Denied access to conflict areas leads to unequal distribution of aid. It is 
easier to provide aid where access is safe and the groups present support 
humanitarian aid and accept its providers. Knowledge of the area is essential. 
Unequal distribution of aid can dissatisfy local communities, and this might distort 
peace negotiations. If accomplished well, aid can prevent further fragmentation in a 
civil war. However, in unsafe areas, usually opposition-held areas, providing aid is 
difficult. If these areas receive no aid or less aid than needed, this can threaten the 
peace process and stability. In this case, it is more likely that the community will 
hinder peace because of this disadvantage. If access is granted, aid may be used as 
a tool to find support among local groups (Meininghaus, 2016).  
 
2.2. Aid Prolongs War 
Narang argues that humanitarian aid can prolong civil war. In his view, providing aid 
is a paradox because while its goal is to relief the population, the aid indirectly 
sustains the war itself. The argument for this is that aid is impartial and therefore 
must be provided to every group involved. Narang identifies four causes based on 
the existing literature, supported by Anderson and Addison, for why aid prolongs war. 
First, aid provides (financial) resources to combatants. Every combatant who is not 
wearing an army uniform blends in with the population, and these individuals can 
obtain resources which can strengthen insurgent groups. Combatants can also steal 
resources from organisations providing aid. Second, aid organisations provide safe 
areas for the population, such as refugee camps. In these areas, combatants can 
shelter and recruit people. Third, aid may relieve groups and allow them to continue 
the war. Narang gives the example that when aid is given to a certain group, the aid 
is used for the group’s basic needs, which means that the resources they already 
have can still be used to sustain the war. Finally, aid (organisations) indirectly 
contribute to the government or another leading group in a war in the form of 
administration costs, visas, taxes, charges, etc. for entrance or protection (Narang, 
2015; Addison, 2000; Anderson, 1999). In support of the argument that aid can 
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prolong war, Addison presents the example that in 1993 in Somalia only half of the 
UN resources meant for humanitarian aid reached the population. Rebels and 
warlords took the other half of the resources. This provides opposition groups with 
the strength to continue the battle, and thus the resources of the opposing groups are 
not exhausted. Addison uses the argument of The Overseas Development Institute in 
London that “in most, if not all, conflicts the role of humanitarian aid as a source of 
support for warring factions has probably been slight. Rather, in those situations 
where relief is blamed for supporting a particular group, this is often the result of 
political and military failings” (Addison, 2000). In other words, the direct cause of 
failure to stabilise a situation is not humanitarian aid itself, but the political and 
military failings to secure the provision of the aid. The value of emergency aid such 
as food and health supplies is also often devaluated to reduce the use of these 
supplies to rebels.  
 
2.3. Aid Does Harm 
Wood and Sullivan argue that aid causes violence in civil conflicts. The reasons for 
this are that, first, aid causes rebels to hunt for necessities for their own use that aid 
organisations are providing. This often comes with violence against aid workers and 
the population to persuade them to give away resources. Second, aid causes rebels 
to lose power and support from the local population because the aid providers are 
taking care of the population. This loss of authority and support can in turn lead to 
violence. The effect of aid on the government is less apparent than the effect aid has 
on rebels. The government might attack aid providers or the population when rebels 
are successful in taking over aid resources for their own use, which would create a 
situation in which the rebels gain more profit and the government is more likely to use 
violence. A reason for the difference between aid and violence by rebels and the 
government is that rebels are generally the weaker actors in a conflict. Violence by 
opposition forces may increase when the government has ties with aid organisations, 
and with this support for the government increases. Wood and Sullivan find that 
during a civil war rebels or opposition groups are not likely to maintain control over 
aid management because they lack military and operational capabilities. However, for 
aid organisations to operate in opposition-controlled areas, the organisations have to 
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cooperate with the opposition authorities otherwise there is a high chance of violence 
or expulsion (Wood & Sullivan, 2015).  
 
2.4. Counter-Insurgency and Aid 
Some policy-makers recognise the usefulness of aid and thus also the usefulness of 
aid providers to contribute to the ‘counterinsurgency toolkit’ by convincing the 
population that supporting the legitimate government is better than supporting 
(violent) opposition groups. Aid providers can gain political support from the local 
communities, and this can in turn used by the military to gain support. This can be 
called the ‘winning the heart and minds’ strategy (Williamson, 2011). However, 
misuse of aid is highly detrimental in this case, and it can therefore be said that not 
all aid providers would cooperate with the military for this reason, despite the fact that 
protection by the military may be important for the safety of aid providers. However, 
in the case of an intervention or a civil war in which the national army supports and 
protects aid workers, this method of winning the heart and minds presents an 
opportunity to come a step closer to peace and stability with minimal use of force. 
However, for aid workers this method often goes against their humanitarian principles 
and is thought to politicise IHL and aid (Williamson, 2011). In addition, aid can be 
used as an indirect means of counter-insurgency instead of counter-insurgency 
operations by an army because of the support created by the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. The danger this poses is related to safety.  
 
2.5. Non-State Armed Groups 
Non-state armed groups are generally those which are not acting in accordance with 
international law and are causing threats to security. In failed or fragile states these 
groups are likely to occur and seize control over territory and people. While most 
non-state groups are not seen as legitimate actors, it is important to include them in 
negotiations to establish peace. Formal negotiations and dialogue are usually not an 
option because intelligence gathering from the opposition can make the non-state 
actor vulnerable. NGOs play an important role in mediating between non-state actors 
and governments because of the relations these organisations sometimes have with 
governments and other involved parties, which enables them to act more freely. 
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However, non-state actors do not always have a clear management and 
organisational network, which means that not every part of the non-state actor may 
be well informed, and some may violate agreements for this reason. IHL constrains 
states more than it does non-state actors, and therefore non-state actors are more 
likely and able to use guerrilla tactics in warfare. States have made attempts to 
impose conventions and international laws on the provision of arms to non-state 
actors. However, there has been much resistance against this for political reasons 
(the USA was one of these states); it is argued that providing arms to non-state 
actors can serve foreign policy purposes and these arms can be used against 
repressive and abusive regimes when the non-state actors are fighting for political or 
economic change. In some cases NGOs are able to make agreements with non-state 
armed groups to prevent them from abusing human rights. However, non-state actors 
must be willing to sign and follow such agreements (Hofmann, 2006).  
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3. Humanitarian Aid and Proxy Civil War 
This chapter explores the connection between humanitarian aid and proxy civil wars. 
While humanitarian aid officially must follow humanitarian principles such as 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, in practice these principles are 
often very difficult to maintain. On the local civil level there are already obstacles, but 
in the case of proxy civil wars foreign actors and aid donors are impeding these 
humanitarian principles even more. When there are more actors and more levels of 
war as in a proxy civil war it is more likely that humanitarian aid will be used to ‘win 
the heart and minds’ and more steered towards a specific group depending on the 
origin and interests of the foreign actors and donors of the aid.  
 
3.1. Proxy Civil War 
Brown draws the following conclusion about the rise of proxy wars after the Cold 
War: "the temptation to rely on military proxies is systemically driven, being 
generated by the structure and basic behaviour of an emergent global system which 
is neither unipolar, nor bipolar, nor even really ‘multipolar’, but polyarchic – a highly 
interactive and interdependent, yet decentralized, system of many kinds of actors, 
large and small, state and non-state” (Brown, 2016, p. 244). In this explanation 
relations of non-state actors amongst each other and with state actors are volatile 
because “today’s allies, state or non-state, may be tomorrow’s adversaries”, 
depending on the context (Brown, 2016, p. 244). This creates uncertain relations and 
situations, and therefore states are less likely to use their own armies and instead 
use proxies to pursue their interests. When armies are on the ground intelligence 
must be gathered, and civilian and military casualties must be minimised. It is safer to 
use groups which are already on the ground locally to fight the war.  
The danger of using proxies to wage war is that the relationship with these proxies 
may be volatile depending on the motives of the proxies. When the motives for the 
proxies are narrow, for example, if they are fighting for money, proxies may lay down 
their arms when the war is causing too much damage. When proxies are fighting for 
greater motives, such as religious, emotional, or historical purpose, peace initiatives 
from the contractor who uses the proxies, such as ceasefires and peace negotiations, 
are likely to be rejected by the proxies because they have their own motives and 
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purposes. These outcomes drive contractors towards the battlefield. Another danger 
is that the contracting state may have to justify this indirect warfare to its citizens and 
parliament, while for the proxy losing the battle is not an option. Otherwise, the 
contracting state must accept the loss, leading to a decrease in credibility, or else the 
contracting state must become directly involved in the war itself (Brown, 2016). 
 
3.2. Humanitarian Principles 
Humanitarian aid is based on four different principles: humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, and independence. The underlying motive of humanity is that “human 
suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian 
action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings” (UN, 2012). 
Impartiality means that “humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need 
alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions 
on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions” 
(UN, 2012). The principle of impartiality can be divided into proportionality, non-
discrimination, and individual impartiality of humanitarian workers. In this regard, 
humanitarian aid prioritises the most urgent cases to provide emergency aid and is 
provided for all human beings regardless of the group they belong to, and individuals 
who provide relief should not take sides or be subjective (Carbonnier, 2015, pp. 32-
33). Neutrality means that “humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or 
engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature” (UN, 
2012). Finally, independence means that “humanitarian action must be autonomous 
from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with 
regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented” (UN, 2012). It is 
difficult for the UN to be neutral, according to Carbonnier, because of the interests of 
the UN member states, and states where the UN operates may believe it to be 
operating in favour of the more influential countries within the UN, which might be 
working against the wishes of the state in question. This means that UN missions to 
provide aid may lack independence and neutrality since independence for 
humanitarian organisations means that there is a certain “autonomy in relation to 
states and non-state actors” (Carbonnier, 2015, p. 33) and the UN cannot be seen as 
autonomous when it is serving the interests of its member states as an international 
political organisation. In addition, the UN did not adopt neutrality in its December 
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1991 resolution (A/RES/46/182) on the ‘Strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ (UN General Assembly, 
1991).  
Outside the context of the UN, the funding of humanitarian aid may be an obstacle 
against the independence of aid-providing organisations when the donor has specific 
interests. In other words, aid-providing organisations may have to decline funds in 
order to avoid being dependent on certain kinds of donors. Donors may also refrain 
from funding aid when it is provided to groups other than the one that the donor 
wants to support (Carbonnier, 2015, p. 33). These challenges are difficult for 
humanitarian aid organisations to overcome, especially in a proxy civil war with all the 
various interests of donors. It is highly problematic for the UN to operate in a proxy 
civil war with the objective of providing aid when opposing groups (local and foreign) 
do not support the UN presence. 
 
3.3. Providing Aid in Proxy Civil Wars 
When a political system fails, in the case of conflict and war, humanitarian relief is 
used to reduce the consequences through emergency aid. The ultimate goal of 
humanitarian aid is to save lives by providing basic necessities. This creates a 
political legitimacy; according to Stein, “Humanitarian action is designed for the short 
term, for limited groups, for limited objectives, until legitimately constituted authority 
can assume its obligations” (Stein, 2000, p. 368). In the case of civil wars the 
population is often the target of rebels, which prevents the provided aid from getting 
to the intended recipients. This makes the provision of aid more difficult. In civil wars 
groups strive to influence the population and to control territory, and may also 
execute individuals for military and political reasons. To the military these killings are 
not seen as collateral damage, but these killings are for the purpose of strategic 
military gains. As noted above, humanitarian aid is exploited by political actors and 
the military to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the population. Since aid providers are 
located in the area of conflict, humanitarian aid can be used by international actors 
involved in the proxy war. The situation depends on the background of the aid 
provider. When it is an independent organisation the influence that politics and the 
military have on the population is probably less than when the organisation is part of 
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and sent by a specific state. During the past century, humanitarian aid has developed 
from state-provided aid, to privatised independent organisations partially funded by 
states. By funding these aid organisations states are still indirectly involved in 
contributing to humanitarian relief. The difficulty of aid provision is that aid providers 
do need some political and military support to gain access to an area in need of relief, 
and the military is needed for the security of the aid workers. The humanitarian 
assistance that aid providers are able to give depends on the interests of the powers 
involved. “Humanitarian assistance is the cause of disengagement by the major 
powers. It is rather the consequence of the withdrawal of the big powers once 
southern societies were no longer a theater of competition in the Cold War” (Stein, 
2000, p. 394). Stein acknowledges that the neutrality of aid providers is a fiction in 
contemporary warfare. Groups in conflict today are predatory and therefore aid 
providers must have security from political actors and the military. If this is the case, 
the political actors and the military are able to steer the aid towards the most 
preferred group. 
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4. The Syrian Conflict 
The conflict in Syria started with the uprising of the Arab Spring protests which called 
for government reforms, greater freedom, and better economic conditions across the 
Arabic countries in 2010 and 2011. During these protests hundreds of protesters 
were killed and arrested by Assad’s army. The Syrian National Council (SNC) and 
the Free Syria Army (FSA) were created when groups split from the Assad 
government and the national army to fight along with the protesters against Assad’s 
regime. The conflict shifted towards a civil war when the national army used 
increasing violence and conducted air strikes against the rebels in 2012. The civil war 
(and the proxy war) in Syria have displaced many Syrians because of the violence, 
causing them to flee to neighbouring countries or outside the region in a mass influx 
of refugees into other states. It is estimated that around 13.5 million Syrians have had 
to seek refuge (Clarion Project, 2017).  
The Syrian war is not a common war. The uniqueness of the war is that it is a multi-
layered proxy war. Whereas previous proxy wars were mostly war related to Cold 
War tensions, the Syrian war is fought as a civil war, a regional war on religious, 
regional, and strategic dominance, and on the global level for global power and 
influence. These proxy-layers are overlapping because each actor is supporting 
another actor on a different level. The involvement of these actors started in 2012-
2013 when the Syrian rebels ceded Syrian territory, which led Iran and Hezbollah to 
support Assad to regain Syrian territory by fighting against the rebels. Moreover, 
Syria and Iran are allies since the 1980 and Syria has helped Iran during the years. 
Therefore, Iran has “granted Syria a one billion Dollar import credit line” and Iran sent 
“senior Revolutionary Guard commanders” to Syria to fight against the opposition 
(Bitar, 2013). Opposing this, the US, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
members started to support the rebels against Assad’s regime. For example, in 2013 
it is estimated that Qatar has armed the rebels with supplied worth of three billion 
Dollars. Though, Russia’s relationship with Syria and the support might be the 
greatest. Russia’s (economic) relationship with Syria is dating from the 1950s, and 
Russian arms sales to Syria in 2011 are of an estimated value of 4 billion Dollars 
(Bitar, 2013). In 2015 Russia entered the proxy war with military support when the 
Syrian government continued to lose territory. In return, the US established training 
programmes for the rebels to counter Russian and Syrian army attacks. However, the 
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training was unsuccessful because of the small size of the training programmes 
(Stewart, 2015). Russia and the US brokered several ceasefires in 2016 (excluding 
attacks on terrorist groups). However, these arrangements have been violated in all 
cases. One of the main goals in the establishment of the ceasefires was to provide 
humanitarian aid. However, during the second ceasefire aid convoys were attacked 
and the security of the aid providers was threatened. It is estimated that the war has 
caused approximately 300,000 deaths in Syria (Clarion Project, 2017).  
The Syrian proxy civil war is because of the multiple levels extremely problematic. 
The relationships between the actors and the multi-layered conflict mean that peace 
prospects are dim and the actors continue to focus on defeating the opposition rather 
than negotiating for peace. This is described in more detail in the sections below. 
 
4.1. Local actors 
The main local actors fighting against each other in Syria are the Syrian Army under 
control of the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the 
Kurds, and the Islamic State (IS). It is the goal of the Syrian regime to remain in 
power, and therefore Assad refuses to resign. The Syrian government has executed 
attacks (also with chemical weapons) against its own citizens, and other activities 
which violate human rights (Clarion Project, 2017).The FSA, comprised largely of 
defectors from the Syrian army, is fighting against the Syrian regime and is one of the 
largest rebel groups supported by the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The goal 
of the FSA is the removal of Assad as President of Syria and the establishment of a 
democratic Syria through the use of guerrilla warfare. Several rebel groups operate 
under the FSA umbrella. However, because of the lack of a unified strategy by the 
FSA and its component groups Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the US have suspended 
their support (Clarion Project, 2017). Another local group is the Kurds, who want their 
own autonomous region (Kurdistan) in the north of Syria (and Iraq). Some Christian 
groups support this goal. The Kurdish group is fighting the IS and terrorist groups to 
drive them away from Kurd territory. Moreover, the Kurds are clashing with Turkey, 
which opposes a Kurdish state (Clarion Project, 2017). The last main local group in 
Syria is the Islamic terrorist group, the IS. Their goal is to establish an Islamic 
caliphate (an Islamic religious state) in Syria and Iraq, and the group is derived from 
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group consists mainly of foreigners who have been radicalised 
in their Islamic beliefs. At the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the terrorist group 
Nusra Front was a part of the IS. The group committed bombings and attacks on 
civilians and other groups. In 2014 the Nusra Front and IS separated, which led to 
the IS taking over territory in Syria. The goal of the IS is to spread the Islamic cause 
in the region under Sharia Law through violence against citizens. The US launched 
airstrikes to combat the terrorist groups. During the years of the conflict IS (and other 
terrorist groups) have lost territory from the Syrian Army and other actors (Clarion 
Project, 2017). In relation to humanitarian aid, IS wants to supervise aid distribution in 
the areas it holds. A large percentage of this aid is used by IS combatants 
themselves, or else the group does not allow aid distribution into its areas. Aid is also 
confiscated by IS through theft and taxation (Martínez & Eng, 2016). 
 
4.1.1. Supporting Assad 
On Assad’s side, Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese Hezbollah provide support. 
Russia’s desire for power relative to the US did not end after the Cold War. The US 
does not want Russia to have more influence in the Middle-Eastern region. Russia 
has had ties with the Syrian government since the 1950s and is operating against US 
interests on the UN Security Council with its power to veto any intervention in Syria 
(together with China, which also supports Assad’s regime financially). Russia has 
made arms deals with the Syrian government and is supporting Assad to remain as 
Syrian President. It is in Russia’s interest to combat religious groups which have ties 
with Islamists in Chechnya (Al-Masri, 2015; Clarion Project, 2017). Russia’s military 
support takes the form of air strikes against the US-supported rebel groups. 
Therefore, Russia opposes a no-fly zone. Russia is also interested the naval facilities 
in Syria for its own fleet (BBC, 2015; Clarion Project, 2017). The other supporter of 
Assad is Iran, which supports Syrian troops financially, militarily and materially. 
Moreover, Iran supports Hezbollah militants fighting on the side of Assad. To Iran this 
conflict is of strategic and geopolitical interest in its conflict with Saudi Arabia for 
regional power and influence. Moreover, Iran’s support of Assad has been an 
instrument in its nuclear negotiations with the US (Al-Masri, 2015).  
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4.1.2. Supporting Opposition 
Foreign actors which support the FSA are the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. 
The US supports the opposition coalition for regime change and democracy and 
supports rebel groups such as the FSA against both the Assad regime and the IS. 
The US accuses Assad of using nerve gas and executing mass atrocities against the 
country’s own citizens. The US provides training for the rebel groups and conducts 
air strikes against the IS. However, the US tries to avoid conducting operations which 
could benefit the Assad regime and its supporters. The US opposes a no-fly zone 
(BBC, 2015). Saudi Arabia and Qatar support not only the FSA, but also Sunni 
Islamic groups fighting Assad’s troops and the IS. Saudi Arabia does not believe that 
Assad can remain in power in Syria and calls on him to resign. To protect the Syrian 
population, Saudi Arabia would like to impose a no-fly zone (BBC, 2015). Saudi 
Arabia financially supports the rebel groups and has provided arms and training for 
them (Clarion Project, 2017). The last major supporter of the opposition groups is 
Turkey. Turkey supports the Syrian opposition and Islamist group (fighting against 
the Kurds) and has hosted more than two million refugees from Syria. The refugees 
to Turkey also include IS fighters who have been medically treated such that they are 
able to fight again (BBC, 2015). This is a dilemma for Turkey, which also conducts air 
strikes against the IS.  
 
4.2. Proxy Conflict 
One of the proxy conflicts in Syria is of a sectarian nature: the long fight between the 
Islamic Sunni and Shia groups. In the Syrian proxy war these groups pit Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar (Sunni) against Iran and Hezbollah (Shia). Iran’s religious incentive to take 
part in the sectarian proxy war is that it wants to prevent Assad’s regime from 
resigning with a Sunni regime taking its place and allying with Saudi Arabia. To 
prevent this takeover, Iran supports Hezbollah in arming and training the Syrian 
army, and fighting in Syria against Sunni opposition troops (Laub, 2017). Iran is in 
conflict with Saudi Arabia not only in Syria, but also in Yemen, which weakens the 
Saudi position in the Syrian conflict. A large part of the Saudi army is operational in 
Yemen, and because of this has less capacity in Syria. Saudi Arabia has announced 
several times that it would send troops or military resources to opposition groups in 
Syria, but so far this has not materialised. These groups would include ‘moderate 
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Islamic groups’, but it is suspected that private Saudi donors are financially 
supporting the radical groups (Spiegel, 2016). Recently, Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
have been in conflict with one another. Saudi Arabia claims that Qatar is financially 
supporting terrorists in the Middle East and is suspected of having ties with Iran. 
Saudi Arabia has cut diplomatic ties with Qatar (Irish, 2017). 
Turkey and the Kurds have been fighting on the regional level for several decades, 
both in Turkey itself and outside of Turkey. The Kurds in Syria are mainly located in 
the north, and Turkey wants to prevent the Kurds from obtaining their own state, 
Kurdistan. In response, the Kurds have accused Turkey of supporting IS combatants 
financially and medically to fight against them. Turkey’s position in this war hinders a 
shared strategy with the US in the Syrian conflict (Al-Masri, 2015). Turkey believes 
Assad should resign; Turkish President Erdogan claims that he is not good for Syrian 
citizens because of the high death rate. This is different from the Turkish position 
before the war. Before 2011 Turkey and Syria had close relations (Clarion Project, 
2017). 
On a global level the US and Russia are also fighting in Syria. The conflict between 
the US and Russia originates from the Cold War and concerns global power. Both 
states strove to be the global dominant power during the Cold War and this has not 
ceased, although now it continues without firm capitalist and communist ideological 
incentives. At the start of the Syrian conflict both states cooperated against the IS. 
However, this cooperation failed when Russia increased support for Assad, while the 
US is supporting Assad’s opposition. On the global stage Russia and China block UN 
intervention in Syria with their UN Security Council veto power. Russia’s support for 
Assad started before the US support for the opposition. The containment strategy of 
the US under Obama, after several interventions in the Middle East, was sufficient for 
the FSA to sustain the fight against the Assad regime. However, Assad’s allies were 
more supportive. “The result was a ‘quagmire’ that Barack Obama wanted to avoid at 
all costs. And Vladimir Putin took advantage of the opportunity to increase Russia's 
geopolitical influence” (Spiegel, 2016). Under Trump the US has recently launched 
missile strikes on a Syrian army base, ‘threatening’ Russian troops at the base, 
according to Russia. Similar to the bombing of the aid convoy, the US claims that it 
had warned Russia before the attack (Osborn, 2017). Negotiations on peace 
prospects in Syria are difficult since Russia positions itself as a mediator while 
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supporting Assad, and the US supports the opposition and has withdrawn from 
negotiations in the past because of Russia’s position in the conflict (Spiegel, 2016). 
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5. Aid in Syria 
Aid provision in Syria is difficult due to the large number of actors, the denial of 
access to territory, and the need to work in line with the humanitarian principles and 
IHL. This chapter describes and analyses aid provision in Syria and the experiences 
of aid providers. Generally, it can be said that to be able to help the population, aid 
organisations (and the involved foreign actors and donors) must keep in mind that 
some of the aid resources will be captured by the local authorities, hindered when 
possible, and used for the continuation of the conflict, especially when the aid 
providers attempt to adhere to humanitarian principles. Moreover, on the practical 
level, aid is mostly affected on the local level. But on the international level, it is 
technically affected when big international aid organisations want to provide help. 
When these organisations are linked to proxy contractors, or when these 
organisations originate from a country which is involved in the war, they are less 
likely to be able to provide aid. 
The experiences of aid workers active in the Syrian civil war between 2012 and 2015 
are described by Martinez and Eng. Multiple interviewees have pointed out that aid 
received from the UN was mostly distributed in government-held areas by 
government personnel. The population in the government-held areas gained less 
from the food aid distributed. Despite the principle of neutrality aid organisations were 
used as a political tool to provide aid. Moreover, because of the lack of access to 
Syrian regions in need of aid (access has to be approved by the government), the aid 
was politicised because it was only able to be distributed through preferred channels 
of the Syrian government and donors. The government and donors did not want the 
aid to reach areas not under government control, or areas or groups not in the 
interests of the donors. Western aid providers experience difficulties in providing aid 
because of the lack of access to Syria. The Syrian government thus prevents aid 
organisations from distributing aid to areas which are held by opposition groups. Only 
certain aid-providing organisations have government approval to provide 
humanitarian aid in certain areas in Syria. The World Food Programme (WFP) of the 
UN and the ICRC must rely on regional aid organisations such as the Syrian Arab 
Red Crescent (SARC) because of access and security issues.  
Martínez and Eng interviewed two civilians, one living in a government-controlled 
area, and the other living in an opposition-controlled area. The civilian living in a 
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government-controlled area stated that the WFP and the ICRC are able to deliver 
food to the civilians every two months. The civilian living in an opposition-controlled 
area stated that the area did not receive aid because the government blocks aid into 
the area. This indicates that most of the approved aid is provided in government-
controlled areas, and SARC, supported by the ICRC, and the UN provide this aid. 
Indirectly, external donors of these organisations are helping the government 
maintain power and control, as the government is able to focus its expenditures on 
warfare instead of food and other necessities for civilians (Martínez & Eng, 2016).  
Another factor is that Assad cannot completely ban aid provision in government-
controlled areas because it is sustaining the government with the provision of aid. 
Otherwise, the government would lose support, control and funding. Martínez and 
Eng refer to what they call the ‘image of comparative security’. This means that 
because there is more aid and security in government-controlled areas, there is an 
increase in migration from opposition-controlled areas to government-controlled 
areas to improve living conditions. This affects the legitimacy of opposition groups 
and their support of civilians. Hunger has a political impact on the conflict. Civilians 
may put pressure on opposition groups to leave an area because this affects the 
provision of necessities (Martínez & Eng, 2016).  
 
5.1. Aid and State Sovereignty 
The problem of access to a state without permission is the violation of state 
sovereignty. To state actors this sovereignty is important. However, to non-state 
actors, effective possession and control of territory is much more important. With the 
permission to access a state to provide aid, IHL establishes the obligation of all 
involved parties to respect the aid workers, humanitarian principles, and the 
recipients of aid. Under the humanitarian principle of impartiality, humanitarian 
assistance to civilians in opposition-held areas does not imply that the providing 
organisation supports this opposition group. Bouchet-Saulnier states that there is a 
difference between the UN Guiding Principles on humanitarian assistance and IHL 
with regard to the notion of ‘other parties’ (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2014). The UN Guiding 
Principles state that in armed conflicts “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the UN Charter 
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and that humanitarian assistance should be provided with consent and, in principle, 
on the basis of an appeal made by the affected country” (UN General Assembly, 
1991). The Guiding Principles address only one party in the state whose sovereignty 
has to be safeguarded. Under IHL aid-providing organisations are able to provide aid 
without affecting the legal status of the involved parties (state actors and non-state 
actors), and humanitarian assistance is not an interference in the conflict but rather 
an act of relief to the population. IHL’s inclusion of all involved parties is an attempt to 
bind all actors to their obligations (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2014). In the case of Syria 
Assad is using the argument that humanitarian aid is violating the sovereignty of the 
state. In this case, state sovereignty would mean that Assad has the power to decide. 
When granting access to Syria to provide aid Assad yields some of this power to aid 
organisations (Martínez & Eng, 2016). According to the Humanitarian Practice 
Network aid organisations experienced difficulties in gaining access to Syria and 
providing aid before the conflict. The Syrian government controlled every facet 
related to aid and negotiations were required in order to provide aid. The Syrian 
government is suspicious towards aid organisations because they also provide aid to 
opposition groups and threaten to delegitimise the Syrian government and create 
support for international action. While the Syrian government claims that it also 
granted access to opposition-held areas, administrative paperwork delayed this 
process. The application for access to areas other than those controlled by the 
government must go through the SARC. This is the main relief organisation in Syria 
and the most local one, and international organisations must cooperate with SARC to 
provide aid in Syria. SARC may be seen as the organiser and gatekeeper of the 
humanitarian principles and organisations and as the communicator with the Syrian 
government. This puts pressure on SARC from all sides (Humanitarian Practice 
Network, 2013). During the years of the conflict Assad has granted access to some 
organisations but only to some areas. 
 
5.2. Humanitarian Aid Organisations and Their Experiences in Syria 
This section describes the largest Western aid-providing organisations in Syria, along 
with their experiences in Syria and their challenges and opportunities in the conflict. 
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5.2.1. UNOCHA 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) filed a 
report on its response to the Syrian crisis from 2011-2016. This report states that in 
2012 UNOCHA began experiencing difficulties with the implementation of 
humanitarian assistance because of economic sanctions imposed by foreign actors. 
These sanctions resulted in shortages of food and higher prices on commodities for 
the civilians. Aid organisations also experience difficulties with shortages of fuel and 
the procurement of commodities and medical supplies. In 2013 the urgency of the 
need for basic commodities increased as the conflict continued. In 2014 Turkey and 
Jordan were able to provide humanitarian assistance across their borders with the 
support of a UN Security Council Resolution. In 2015 UNOCHA experienced still 
more difficulties in providing aid because of increased problems of limited access and 
security. With the involvement of new local groups in the conflict the violence rate 
increased (UNOCHA, N.D.). One of the successes over the years was the passage 
of UN Security Council Resolution 2165 in 2014, in which the Council “[…] 2. Decides 
that the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners are 
authorized to use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-
Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in 
use, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical 
supplies, reaches people in need throughout Syria through the most direct routes, 
with notification to the Syrian authorities, and to this end stresses the need for all 
border crossings to be used efficiently for United Nations humanitarian operations” 
(UN, 2014).  
Despite the obstruction by the Syrian government of access to Syrian territory to 
provide humanitarian aid to civilians in need, the UN was able to create more access 
points to deliver emergency aid more directly to difficult locations. However, 
UNOCHA, as an overarching aid-providing organisation, is not able to act in its role 
as a coordination entity since the Syrian government does not accept this and prefers 
local NGOs to operate within Syria. The Syrian government and the Syrian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs closely monitor the steps the UN takes in providing aid to the Syrian 
civilians. For the UN the creation of more access points was one of the four main 
strategic goals of UNOCHA in this crisis. The other three are “scaling up the 
response, dealing with the refugee crisis and its effect on neighbouring countries, 
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and unifying the disparate elements of the humanitarian operation” (UNOCHA, 2016, 
p. iv). The UN recognised that it had failed in response to the humanitarian crisis in 
Syria. It was unable to provide aid equally in Syria due to access problems, there was 
a shortage of medical supplies, and security within civilian centres and medical 
facilities could not be guaranteed. Moreover, the response of UNOCHA was slow. 
 
5.2.2. WHO 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) focuses mainly on medical and health 
facilities within Syria. Because of the war access to health care has decreased. The 
WHO 2016 annual report states that about one-third of wounded civilians are unable 
to get medical care and are therefore scarred for life. The WHO is an overarching 
organisation which helps to coordinate the ICRC and SARC. The WHO attempts to 
ensure neutral and safe access to Syria with the involved actors in the conflict and 
stresses this importance on a diplomatic level. WHO has strong ties with the 
International Syria Support Group, SARC, ICRC, the Office of the Special Envoy for 
Syria, and religious leaders and the community itself in Syria. UN Security Council 
Resolution 2165 helped the WHO obtain access into Syria to provide emergency 
medical for civilians. Despite attacks on aid convoys, such as the attack on the UN 
aid convoy with SARC personnel in 2016 (MSF, 2016), WHO has succeeded in 
providing aid in areas which were long inaccessible with the help of inter-agency aid 
convoys. Still, aid provision is generally difficult. In 2016 the WHO filed 41 requests to 
supply medicines, and more than half of these requests were denied by the 
authorities. In early 2016 authorities granted approval for medical evacuation of those 
in urgent need from besieged areas and areas which are difficult to access. However, 
since hundreds have been evacuated the authorities grant permission only 
occasionally, and even when evacuation was allowed the treatment sometimes 
arrived too late (WHO, 2017). 
 
5.2.3. ICRC 
ICRC works closely with SARC to provide aid in Syria. Combined, these 
organisations are the largest aid providers in Syria, but both have lost many staff 
members to the conflict (American Red Cross, 2016). In 2014 the ICRC provided 
Malissa Hulsman S1643924 
 
30 
 
emergency aid mostly in government-controlled areas. The ICRC has provided food, 
water, materials, and health supplies. Some volunteers have provided these 
necessities to opposition-controlled areas. ICRC access was limited to a few cities in 
the government-controlled area. ICRC’s and SARC’s successes are mostly related to 
the provision of water and water facilities, the provision of medical supplies and 
electricity generators, and financial support (ICRC, 2014). Over the years ICRC and 
SARC have managed to operate in opposition-held areas as well. However, access 
to these areas has been temporary (American Red Cross, 2016). ICRC has identified 
key issues that must be addressed to decrease the suffering of the civilians. IHL must 
be obeyed. The need of military use and military protection of civilians has to be 
considered. Moreover, depoliticised access must be granted and it must be 
unconditional and unimpeded. The impact the conflict is not only local but regional. 
Syrians have fled from the conflict and this affects the whole region (ICRC, 2017). 
 
5.2.4. MSF 
Doctors Without Borders/Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) operates in Syria to 
provide medical care. During the conflict five staff members have been abducted in 
Syria. MSF supports local doctors and medical staff and operates in the most 
strongly affected regions by providing training and materials in areas controlled by 
the government and in areas held by opposition groups (Médecins Sans Frontières, 
2015). MSF has recognised international failures of aid provision in 2013. The health 
care system, health care facilities, and health workers were attacked and their work 
and lives were insecure. Not only the international aid providers but also the local aid 
providers were unable to do their jobs. The local authorities saw these health care 
workers “enemies of the regime” because they were providing medical assistance to 
citizens in need, and the consequence of this was “arrest, imprisonment, torture or 
even death” (Tung, 2013).  
At the beginning of the conflict MSF did not operate in Syria because the government 
refused to grant access. To help the civilians MSF donated medical supplies and 
medicines to local health facilities. In June 2012 MSF was able to open medical 
facilities in the north of Syria secretly. Later that year MSF (unofficially) opened two 
hospitals in the opposition-controlled areas. These hospitals were targeted by the 
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(Syrian) military, and small private clinics or hospitals had to open to take care of the 
wounded. Areas were taken by the FSA, and they often took over the local hospitals 
or located their hospitals close to the public hospitals, which made them targets of 
the government. Medical supplies scarce because of the war (sanctions have been 
imposed on Syria by Western countries, and this affects the internal medical supply 
and health system) (Tung, 2013).  
Power facilities are targeted by the military, which in turn affects health facilities. 
Moreover, there is a shortage of medical staff because of the fear of attacks, and 
many people have fled the country. The civilians are victims in the war. While there 
are many casualties in the civilian public health facilities, civilians are turned down by 
hospitals for medical care and combatants are given priority. The obstacles for 
providing aid are the government, which controls the foreign aid flow into the country, 
the refusal of access to provide aid, and security issues. Even if organisations have 
found ways to provide aid, cross-border provision of aid is generally accepted by 
neighbouring countries, but there is a lack of administrative and logistical support by 
these countries. This delays aid provision and affects donor funding because of the 
financing rules that the organisations face. MSF stresses that “to cover the needs of 
civilians, the capacity of humanitarian actors to provide impartial aid throughout Syria 
must be increased and cross-border operations must be facilitated” (Tung, 2013). 
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6. Establishing Peace in Syria 
At the beginning of the war in 2012, a six-point peace plan was created by Kofi 
Annan, calling for “the Syrian authorities to cease military repression and the use of 
heavy weapons in populated areas. Annan guaranteed he would seek similar 
commitments from the armed opposition groups to bring about a sustained cessation 
of armed violence in all its forms by all parties. The plan also demanded a provision 
of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, the release of 
arbitrarily detained persons and those involved in peaceful activities, ensure freedom 
of movement throughout the country for journalists, and respect the right of Syrians to 
demonstrate peacefully” (UNOCHA, 2016, p. 7). Five years after the creation of this 
plan, peace is still far from being established. Attempts at peace are usually made 
through mediation and negotiation. However, in the Syrian proxy civil war, with many 
actors and different levels of war to negotiate about, peace prospects are far more 
hazy. In a civil war situation with third parties the local rebel groups tend to prolong 
peace negotiations to gain as much as possible. But in the Syrian proxy civil war the 
ethnic and political divisions between the local groups are not the only factors at the 
negotiating table. The multiple other conflicts on top of this create further demands 
and different negotiating tables, and even when concessions can be made on one 
table, the others must reach an agreement too. This makes prospects on peace even 
more difficult. 
 
6.1. Termination of War 
When civil wars turn into proxy civil wars with the involvement of external states 
pursuing their own interests via local actors, these external actors can either help to 
establish a stable situation or prolong the conflict. When external parties are able to 
make guarantees to the involved parties it is more likely that the local actors can 
make settlements. Sawyer, Gallagher, Cunningham and Reed have concluded that 
rebels in a civil war who are financially supported by external actors are not likely to 
agree with peace settlements with a government and instead prolong civil conflicts in 
the hope that they will gain more. Governments tend to agree to concessions on 
peace settlement when they are more profitable than proceeding in the conflict. 
When there is an asymmetry in power and materials, where the government has the 
advantage, the government is remains uncertain as to who will win. However, there is 
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also uncertainty regarding how much the government army will be damaged and how 
costly will it be when the government uses violence to overcome the rebels. The 
costs of fighting to the rebels are difficult to estimate because they depend on the 
utility, ability, resources, and support these rebels have. These factors are to the 
advantage of rebels when negotiating. There is also uncertainty when the support of 
the rebels is fungible. For example, financial support can be used in various ways 
other than for fighting, and it is difficult for the government to estimate the usage of 
this support. This leads to further uncertainty in the costs of fighting off the rebels. 
When rebels are supported (financially or through the provision of arms) by external 
actors, this has a significant effect on the termination of war. With external support 
conflicts last longer because rebels are able to sustain the war. However, when 
foreign troops physically enter the war and support rebels, it becomes more likely that 
the war will come to an end (Sawyer, Gallagher Cunningham, & Reed, 2017).  
 
6.2. Division and Peace Attempts 
Internally, Syria is divided between the government and non-state actors with various 
ethnic and religious backgrounds. After the First World War Syria’s borders were 
drawn by the allied powers, and several disparate groups were put into one state. 
This caused violence and divergence. Hafez Al-Assad, the father of the current 
President, Bashar Al-Assad, seized power in a coup in 1970. The powers of the 
President have increased over the years, accompanied by the limitation of individual 
freedom, until the point where we are now. When Bashar Al-Assad became President 
he promised change and restored some of the relationships with neighbouring 
countries and the West. However, in 2007 Syria was suspected of enrichment of 
uranium and therefore the creation of weapons of mass destruction, which concerned 
the external actors in the conflict. During the Arab Spring, the Syrian internal division 
widened as a result of the governing of Assad and the differences between the 
groups within the Syrian state whose borders were drafted by the Western allies 
almost 100 years ago. The external actors in the conflict in the UN Security Council 
wanted a resolution to force Assad to step down as a President. However, Russia 
and China were against this resolution and used their veto power. This mirrors the 
support of these external powers for the Syrian internal actors in the conflict. The 
Arab League suspended the membership of Syria and began imposing sanctions 
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against the country. “In 2012 an international coalition was formed (later known as 
the Action Group for Syria), consisting of the U.N., Arab League, and EU (China, 
France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S., and Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar)” (Pitrof, 
2015, p. 167). The goal of this coalition was to reach a consensus on the situation in 
Syria and the future of this state through the creation of a transitional government 
and holding of elections. Opposing opinions from the US and Russia were among the 
reasons why these plans failed and a consensus could not be reached. Over the 
years the UN has attempted to impose several ceasefires, but these attempts have 
failed. Attempts to have all internal actors at the negotiating table have failed and the 
actors have been unwilling to capitulate. One factor that strengthened the conflict is 
the provision of arms from international actors to internal actors. Russia provided 
arms to the Syrian government and its supporters (Pitrof, 2015). The UA and Saudi 
Arabia provided arms for the opposition groups such as the FSA, and the IS is 
receiving arms from extremist supporters who want the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate with Sharia Law.  
 
6.3. Problems and Solutions 
Pitrof identifies several hurdles to peace in Syria and proposes solutions to overcome 
them. Pitrof addresses the question of whether negotiations could bring peace. Her 
answer to this is that a neutral third party, not one of the involved external actors, 
could provide a solution if the internal actors in the conflict are willing to sit around the 
table to negotiate. This brings us to the second hurdle, which is that, based on 
Pitrof’s first suggestion, it is not clear who will represent the Syrian opposition, since 
there are many groups opposing the Syrian regime. This could mean that all groups 
would sit at the table, with more voices leading to a smaller chance for an agreement. 
The various ethnic and religious backgrounds make this even more difficult. Pitrof 
calls this an internal problem. Mediation is only possible when there is unity within the 
groups, and otherwise groups are unwilling to lay down their arms. The third problem 
is related to the previous two problems. The opposition covers a wide “political and 
ideological spectrum” with groups including “the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus 
Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee, the Kurdish Bloc, 
the Assyrian Bloc, and Independents” (Pitrof, 2015, p. 171). The nature of the conflict 
has changed drastically. At the start of the conflict the opposition resisted the 
Malissa Hulsman S1643924 
 
35 
 
repression of the government and advocated for more political freedom. More groups 
with other objectives have entered the conflict in the intervening years, which thwarts 
peace prospects. This means that the opposition must develop with a shared 
objective before entering any negotiation on the outcome of the conflict. The fifth 
problem relates most closely to this research. The international actors with their 
interests also present a problem in peace negotiations because feed the conflict. The 
involvement of international actors brings even more objectives to the table and the 
opposing opinions are not only amongst the internal actors, but also amongst the 
external international actors. A proposed solution is for the international actors to take 
a step back. The various internal actors and interests are already presenting an 
obstacle to peace, and if (external) actors want the conflict to be stabilised then their 
involvement and interests should be limited. The last problem is public scrutiny; when 
actors make concessions it seems as if there is not a complete victory, which in 
public opinion can be considered a loss. The proposed solution is to conduct 
negotiations ‘behind closed doors’. This prevents damage to images and prevents 
overwhelming media attention (Pitrof, 2015). 
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7. Case Studies from the Past 
During the Cold War humanitarian aid was used as a tool to influence the population 
to support either the communist side or the non-communist side. Most proxy civil 
wars during the Cold War were under the influence of the US and the Soviet Union. 
In the current Syrian conflict the US and Russia once again oppose each other and 
have different interests in the conflict and its outcome. To analyse whether 
humanitarian aid has a different effect on peace prospects in proxy civil wars it is 
important to look at more than one case. Therefore, in this chapter, the proxy civil 
wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam and humanitarian aid during these wars are 
explored. In both cases we see that it is important to adapt aid provision to the 
specific case, and that the level of proxy support from the foreign actor is important to 
be able to win a war.  
 
7.1. Vietnam 
The Vietnam started as a proxy war until the US decided to join the war against 
communist influences in Vietnam directly. North Vietnam was under the influence of 
the communist Soviet Union and China, while South Vietnam was under the influence 
of the US. The President of the US at that time, John F. Kennedy, called the war 
‘their war’ and claimed no intention of waging war directly against communism. The 
US provided South Vietnam with military equipment and military advisors. When the 
South Vietnamese were unable to defend and secure themselves, the US took on the 
task of securing South Vietnamese bases. In this way the US slowly made it ‘their 
war’ with military involvement, creating another layer in the conflict, especially with 
the aid provided to fight against communism. The US became the main actor against 
the North Vietnamese communists when South Vietnamese troops shifted from 
military tasks to political tasks to control the South Vietnamese population. According 
to Brown, because the US and South Vietnam lost to the communists, the US 
learned that it could not completely rely on proxy groups, and must always be able to 
directly enter the war itself (Brown, 2016).  
From 1954 to 1961 the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and 
Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs) provided aid to South Vietnam. This 
provision of aid was political rather than neutral since it had as its objective to take 
Malissa Hulsman S1643924 
 
37 
 
away communism from the Vietnamese and save them from it. The South 
Vietnamese and US government cooperated with these organisations to reach the 
objectives, suggesting to the US that it could duplicate its ideology and institutions in 
another state. This was CARE’s vision while the Cold War developed into “an 
effective instrument of foreign policy [...] in breaking down barriers between nations 
and creating everywhere a feeling of friendship for America and Americans” 
(Pergande, 2002, p. 3). While (Catholic) people were fleeing from North to South 
Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government and the US government-supported aid 
organisation cooperated to provide emergency relief to these people and to ‘win their 
hearts and minds’. This even went so far that the South Vietnamese and US 
government forbade CARE from providing aid to the North Vietnamese people so as 
to ‘not help the enemy’ (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014; Pergande, 2002). Though 
CARE had helped many Vietnamese people with emergency assistance, the 
organisation retained strong ties with the US government and operated in concert 
with their foreign policy objectives in the ‘American way’, which was not effective 
enough and resulted in waste of food and materials. 
Pergande has described why aid from the US failed in Vietnam. First, the South 
Vietnamese government was too weak. Second, the US made mistakes and followed 
the wrong approach. Last, the communists were too strong. These factors, in 
combination with South Vietnam not having the historical bond of a nation-state, 
caused the failure of US aid and the US proxy war (Pergande, 2002). 
 
7.2. Afghanistan 
Until the 1970s both the Soviet Union and the US attempted only to influence 
Afghanistan to adopt either a communist path or a capitalist path. Both countries sent 
aid to various parts of Afghanistan. Since the Soviet Union was in direct geographical 
proximity to Afghanistan, the influence of the Soviet Union dominated over the 
influence of the US. After the abolition of the Afghan monarchy and the rise of Islamic 
leadership throughout Afghanistan after a military coup by pro-Soviet officers, the 
Soviet Union entered Afghanistan to take control of the situation (Barnett, 1997). In 
the Afghan war of the 1980s, the Afghan government was supported by the 
communist Soviet Union. The Soviet Union installed a puppet Afghan government 
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after the Afghan communists caused the situation to get out of hand by seizing 
power. The force that the Soviet Union used led to an increase in Afghan nationalism 
(Brown, 2016). The Mujahidin, of Pashtun and Tajik origin, were among these 
nationalistic insurgents and were eventually supported by the US Central Intelligence 
Agency to fight against communism, receiving arms and anti-helicopter and anti-tank 
materials. To counter this, the Soviet Union trained and armed ethnic ‘Afghanistani’ 
groups who were not part of the Mujahidin. The local knowledge of these 
Afghanistani groups was seen as useful to the Soviets. By mapping ethnic groups 
and their interests, the Afghan government and Soviets were able to find supporting 
tribes, groups, and Mujahidin defectors to fight against the Mujahidin. Williams has 
argued that the tribal support for the communist Soviet Union and Afghan 
government resulted from the tribes being bought off and promised more autonomy 
(Williams, 2012). However, Soviet funding came to an end at the end of the 1980s 
because the Soviet President Gorbachev had other priorities (Brown, 2016). This 
created a fear that tribes would turn against communism and join the Mujahidin. This 
fear turned out to be grounded, as the tribes were targeting the Afghan government, 
which quickly collapsed (Williams, 2012). 
After the Vietnam War, the US established Governmental Non-Governmental 
Organisations to prevent aid organisations from providing aid to the enemy and to 
work with the anti-communist policy. Afghanistan is one example of this (Pérouse de 
Montclos, 2014). Baitenmann recognises three groups of NGOs that operated in the 
Afghan war. The first group includes NGOs active in Pakistan to provide relief to 
Afghan refugees. The second group consist of NGOs which conducted cross-border 
operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The third and last group was advocacy 
NGOs. Through the first group, the UN was able to distribute emergency aid equally, 
but the smaller NGOs’ aid was divided more unequally because of security issues 
and problems with distribution. Still, it is estimated that these organisations were able 
to provide most necessities to at least one-third of refugees. However, this aid was 
not completely apolitical because of the interests and pressure of Pakistan and the 
US. Pakistan wanted to retain control over its territory and its influence on the NGOs 
and therefore imposed restrictions on the provision of aid, such as prohibiting 
provision of aid outside of the refugee camps. This was also to prevent the aid 
organisations from clashing with one another. Moreover, Pakistan was concerned 
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that if aid was not provided well, this could have an effect on Pakistan’s economic 
and political stability. The US feared that without aid the refugees might clash with 
the Pakistani government and that either the refugees or Pakistan would be driven 
towards the communist Soviet Union.  
In addition to the political struggles, the UN experienced problems in Pakistan 
because of corruption, bureaucracy, and shortage of staff. This last resulted in 
discrimination in aid provision because local tribes were used to distribute aid. In the 
second group, some of the NGOs conducting cross-border operations claimed that it 
is much more efficient to provide aid to the Afghan population inside the country than 
outside the country. This was to prevent people from fleeing “and stress that aiding 
the refugees is to play the Soviets' game by encouraging the Afghans to give up the 
fight and leave the country” (Baitenmann, 1990, p. 11). The US supported this by 
being the biggest funder of cross-border operations to keep the population in the 
country with the incentive that these people would turn against the Communists and 
their supporters. One of the problems of cross-border aid was unreliability. NGOs 
were not sure whether their staff was allowed by local commanders to enter 
Afghanistan (this was seen as illegal), and these commanders could be corrupt and 
bureaucratic. Aid sometimes strengthens these commanders and aid became 
politicised. This cooperation of NGOs with commanders gave the organisation 
intelligence that international actors such as the US found useful.  
The approaches of the NGOs differed significantly, which caused unbalance, 
inequality, and division among the recipients and aid providers. The last group, the 
advocacy NGOs, are those which advocated for support for the resistance against 
the communist Soviet Union and the Afghan government and their supporting 
groups. Besides these objectives, the advocacy NGOs were also advocating for 
humanitarian assistance for the Afghan refugees (Baitenmann, 1990). The soft power 
of the NGOs, Western and private aid, and the hard power used by the US proxy 
Mujahidin, together with the priority decrease of the Soviet Union, helped the US to 
defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War in Afghanistan in 1989 (Stockton, 2004, p. 
12). Both Nicholas Stockton and Pérouse de Montclos describe the use of 
humanitarian aid in the Afghan proxy war as a ‘force multiplier’ (Stockton, 2004; 
Pérous de Montclos, 2014). In this conflict aid contributed to the victory of the US 
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along with the use of proxy force. However, the proxy war turned into a civil war after 
the defeat of the Soviets (Stockton, 2004, p. 13).  
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8. Conclusion 
There is a small difference between humanitarian aid in the case of a civil war and in 
the case of a proxy civil war as concerns the establishment of peace. Peace 
prospects in relation to humanitarian aid in the case of a proxy civil war are much 
more complicated than in the case of a non-proxy civil war because of the disparate 
interests of all the foreign and local actors and the various layers of war. All groups 
are not likely to give up their interests because there is too much at stake. Even when 
actors on the local level are able to reach consensus, the same must be the case on 
the other layers of war. Otherwise, these international actors will continue to feed the 
conflict. To ‘win the heart and minds’ of the population is a military and political 
strategy to influence the population often via aid. The method of providing aid must 
be adapted to a specific case and situation and must be distributed as equally as 
possible for aid to have a beneficial effect on peace. The population can then press 
more for stability when their own lives are less endangered by deprivation of 
necessities. But this is still only on the local level. The best way for humanitarian aid 
to support peace prospects is if the international actors withdraw from the conflict. 
Otherwise, aid may continue to feed other groups. However, this is highly unlikely 
because these international actors will not give up easily, and will remain to use 
humanitarian aid as a tool. 
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